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“Comparative Media Role during 
Revolutions: Iran vs. Egypt” 
Razan Hilal 
ABSTRACT 
 
The role of social media in contemporary Arab revolutions has been controversial. This 
thesis examines the role that media has played in the Egyptian uprising of 2011 in 
comparison to that of the Iranian Revolution of 1978. The aim is to depict the 
differences in media roles with the presence of social media during the Egyptian 
revolution – especially in facilitating the attainment of political mobilizations. The 
notion of enhanced solidarity through utilizing social media is put to scrutiny via a 
comparative examination between the two revolutions in general (the prerequisites and 
tools used) and scholarly work (contemporary research) in particular. The thesis reveals 
that despite the significant role played by social media in the Egyptian revolution, it 
doesn‟t demonstrate significant comparative difference as a catalyzing agency.  
Keywords: Egyptian Uprising, Iranian Revolution, Social Media, Conventional Media, 
Solidarity  
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
The Arab Spring has left many wondering about the causes of these revolutions. 
How did they simply happen? Other questions were raised about the media‟s role in the 
Arab Spring. These include: how does the media contribute to an uprising? Does it 
really play a role? Can a revolution take place without even utilizing it? Can what 
happened in Egypt really be called a “Facebook Revolution?” Such questions were 
highly debated in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. All together they form the dialogue 
on the role of social media in the uprisings. The debate on social media‟s contribution to 
the Arab Spring is divided into two camps: the doubters and the advocates. Two of the 
skeptics are Malcolm Gladwell and Evegeny Morozov. Gladwell is a journalist with 
The New Yorker
1
. In his article “Small Change,” he maintains that genuine societal 
transformation is only achieved through “high-risk activism” in which revolts are 
powerfully connected to the extent that they are willing to provide sacrifices. An 
example of such activism is the Montgomery Boycott of Martin Luther King. Gladwell 
believes that social media provides the opposite: fragile connections and “low-risk 
activism.” This is because people assume that they are contributing to change through 
“retweeting” a story. To illustrate, Twitter enables you to follow new people (that the 
individual had encountered for the first time) (Adams, 2010). As for Facebook, it is a 
                                                          
1
 See: The Role of Social Media in the Arab Spring in Pangaea Journal by Sabiha Gire: Retrieved from 
http://sites.stedwards.edu/pangaea/the-role-of-social-media-in-the-arab-spring/. 
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method that helps in quickly gaining new friends that sometimes reach up to thousands. 
This is depleting, then, the possibility of having friends in the real life. The point is that 
the fragile bonds of such media rarely lead to “high-risk activism” (Adams, 2010). 
Gladwell also assumed that activism must be controlled by a “central authority” in order 
to be effective. Such a centralized effort is not found in social media which, thereby, 
makes revolution unsuccessful. He concluded that while social networks might be 
beneficial for specific “communication,” they don‟t lead to the needed societal 
transformation. This is due to the individuals‟ incapability to commit to the obligations 
necessary for that change to take place. Gladwell further stated that: “the nature of their 
medium means they do so with negligible risk and therefore negligible effect.” In other 
words, the utilization of Facebook, for instance, is an un-risky tool, when compared to 
the old mechanisms such as, marching in the streets and facing the possibility of getting 
beaten by the police.  
2
 Gladwell, however, was criticized, especially by Tweeters, 
because they felt that he was threatening their future (due to their credence that the 
future is for them only) (Adams, 2010). This again shifts back to the debate mentioned 
earlier. Further to this, Evegeny Morozov, a visiting scholar at Stanford University, 
assumed that the huge amount of data provided by social media leads people to lose 
focus regarding a certain matter. This is because they simply don‟t thoroughly deal with 
the prevailing issues. Instead, they quickly jump to the new subject.  For instance, in the 
aftermath of the Iranian Revolution of 2009 the tweets on Twitter were mainly on that 
subject, but this quickly changed after the death of Michael Jackson. At some point in 
                                                          
2
 See article by Malcolm Gladwell: Small Change, Why the revolution will not be tweeted? :  
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/10/04/small-change-3 
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the revolution, Facebook groups and the retweets have also disseminated questionable 
information (Rosen, 2011). As for the advocates camp, Clay Shirky, a professor at New 
York University, examined  
3
the ways through which social media helped in shifting the 
point of view away from political one. This is due to the excessive prevailing data that 
allows individuals to thoroughly take their decisions. This data imposes no restrictions 
on them, even in countries with exploitive governments. They are attained based on 
what a person decides to share on such social media sites (Gire, n.d.). The two camps 
agree on social media‟s utilization by the advocates. For instance Malcolm Gladwell, 
the main skeptic of Twitter's influence, stated that "surely the least interesting fact about 
them is that some of the protesters may (or may not) have at one point or another 
employed some of the tools of the new media to communicate with one another.” In 
other words, he is stating that, undoubtedly, at one point in the uprising activists have 
utilized social media. The debate, therefore, revolves around this point: advocates at a 
certain time had relied on social media to disseminate their content and to organize 
protests. The second step they have taken is the range of this media‟s impact. Moving 
away from the debate Jay Rosen of NYU
4
 explained this confusion around social media 
by stating:  “that's no one's fault: In the midst of a revolution, it was not always easy to 
suss out the details of who was leading it, what social tools they were using, and what 
effects those tools were having. But now that the dust has started to settle, journalists 
                                                          
3
 see: Shirky, Clay. “THE POLITICAL POWER OF SOCIAL MEDIA: TECHNOLOGY, THE PUBLIC 
SPHERE, AND POLITICAL CHANGE.” Foreign Affairs Jan.-Feb. 2011: n. pag. Print. 
4
 Press Think is a project of the Arthur L. Carter Journalism Institute at New York University see: Jay 
Rosen‟s Press Think http://pressthink.org/about/ 
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and academics are beginning to piece that story together.” In other words, Rosen is 
saying that it is hard to understand what‟s happening in the revolution, especially in 
terms of who is in charge and what instruments were being used. Things would only 
become clearer in the aftermath of the uprising, after the revolution ends (Rosen, 2011). 
Indeed, social media‟s role in the “Arab Spring” had mesmerized and perplexed 
scholars and researchers (Green, 2011). This explains the constant debates between both 
old and novel media. At first, scholars discussed the significance of the “printed media 
and oral transmission.” Some, however, have stood up for the crucial role of “printing” 
while others stressed on the significance of media as a way of social gesticulating and 
“public opinion” coordination. Then this debate shifted to the new social media (The 
Economist, 2011). The discussion around social media‟s impact in the insurrections of 
2011 is an ongoing process. With regard to Egypt a number of debaters believed that 
social media‟s power rests on simultaneously enabling the activists to organize and 
transfer the unraveling events. This is what helped ignite the uprising. Some opponents 
of this notion, on the other hand, stated that at the time of the uprising social media also 
had a negative impact. For instance, the new media disabled the advocates from bluntly 
facing Mubarak‟s government. Doubters collectively stated that regimes can 
successfully take advantage of the existing know-hows for espionage and 
destabilization. They backed up this argument by giving the example of “Iran‟s Green 
Revolution of 2009.” They also claimed that not more than 5% of Egyptians are on 
Facebook and Twitter. Second, they stated that those active on Twitter may not be in 
Egypt, but still, their tweets would be adopted by the journalists as a basis for their 
work. These critics, along with the researchers, acknowledge the fact that revolutions 
5 
 
undergo different stages and that “social media technologies” played a noticeable role in 
the first stage of the uprising in 2011 which endured throughout the revolution. With 
regard to Egypt, a number of debaters believed that “social media” power rests on 
simultaneously enabling the activists to organize and transfer the unraveling events. 
This is what helped ignite the uprising. Some opponents of this notion, on the other 
hand, stated that at the time of the uprising social media also had a negative impact. For 
instance, the new media disabled the advocates from bluntly facing Mubarak‟s 
government (Srinivasan, 2011). 
The purpose of my study is to look into the role of the media in the past (Iranian 
Revolution) and the present (Egyptian Uprising). This comparison mainly aims to study 
the two different types of media in the context of the revolutions. The thesis is not 
suggesting that social media was a prerequisite for a revolution, nor it is saying that this 
new media, by itself, caused the revolution. It does, however, examine the ways in 
which the new social media made the revolution in Egypt different than that of Iran. 
This examination provides insight on how the role of the new form of media (or social 
media) in the Egyptian Revolution made it different from than that of Iran through 
creating the solidarity needed in a much easier way (paper‟s hypothesis).  In sum: 1) 
what are the media venues used in the Egyptian Uprising and the Iranian Revolution? 2) 
What is the general role of media in the revolutions? 3) How did media contribute to the 
revolutions? 4) How did the new social media (Facebook, Twitter, etc.) make the 
Egyptian Uprising different from the Iranian Revolution? 5) In what ways is the new 
Social Media facilitating the solidarity needed in the revolutions? 
6 
 
This paper‟s focus then tackles a specific aspect of the general literature review 
through stressing on the significance of media in the proceedings of the revolutions. The 
latter is discussed through considering the two revolutions: Iran in 1978 and Egypt in 
2011. However, a consideration of these two revolutions can be found in other scholarly 
works.  For example, there is a thesis that equated between the old-style media institutes 
and trifling media through considering the “1978 Iranian Revolution” and the “2011 
Egyptian Uprising.” The main aim of this thesis was to detect the utilization of news 
sources at the moment of the crisis.
 5
 Another article on general importance of media 
was written by John Rahaghi. He stressed on media used by the revolts in the two 
revolutions that occurred in Iran (years 1978 and 2009)
6
. These reviews didn‟t focus on 
the difference that the media made (whether in the Iranian or Egyptian Revolutions), but 
they, nonetheless, highlight the importance of the new social media with regard to 
assembling a revolution. The point is that this thesis helps in grasping the real role of 
social media in the revolutions through considering the media of the past and the 
present. In more modern revolutions, it is important to understand the correlation 
between the new social media and revolutions. The thesis further aims to investigate 
social media‟s stance in revolutions‟ success, i.e. how did the social media make the 
                                                          
5
 See thesis by Charlotte Hickson: A Study Comparing the 1979 Iranian Revolution and 2011 Revolution 
In Regards To the Interconnection Between Mainstreem Media & Small Media and the Use and Change  
of Sources In News Over Time :  http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/files/2011/12-Charlotte-Hickson.pdf   
6
 See article by John Rahaghi : New Tools, Old Goals: Comparing the Role of Technology in the 1979 
Iranian Revolution and the 2009 Green Movement : 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1992986 
 
7 
 
Egyptian Uprising successful? Here lies the thesis‟s significance. Before elaborating on 
this last point, general information on four main aspects must first be discussed. These 
are: globalization, media, and the two revolutions (Iranian and Egyptian). Generally 
speaking, media can‟t be discussed before talking about globalization. After all, 
globalization and communication are interrelated. Many scholars assume that 
globalization can‟t exist without media and communication. The latter is due to: 1) 
media companies constantly globalizing the media and its functions; 2) the role that 
global media plays in the way we comprehend or process world events; and 3) the 
worldwide communication infrastructure aids in easily transmitting global information 
(Fathima, 2015). 
Before proceeding, it must be noted that after introducing the general debate 
around the subject (social media‟s role in the uprising) and the purpose of the thesis, the 
advantages and limits of the comparative methodology must be mentioned. The 
comparison‟s advantages are mirrored in the huge similarities (discussed throughout the 
thesis) between the two revolutions. The sole difference between the two is the tool that 
the revolts used. This helps in understanding the real role of social media in the uprising 
(at the basis of solidarity enhancement). In other words, how can social media have an 
impact in two dissimilar revolutions? The resemblances between the Iranian Revolution 
and Egyptian Uprising reveal that effect.  The previous point reflects upon the reason 
behind considering the two revolutions. It is illogical to compare and contrast two 
completely different insurgencies. Though the comparison reveals the significance of 
social media in the Egyptian uprising, the points discussed here are merely possible 
explanations and not definite or final implications. This is what forms the comparison‟s 
8 
 
limits. The two case studies (Iranian Revolution and Egyptian Uprising) are not enough 
for assuring whether social media has or doesn‟t have a role in a revolution. The topic 
under discussion is still new and is of highly debatable. Another possible limit is that 
the Iranian Revolution might seem to be underestimated here. This is because of thesis‟s 
sole focus on the tools used by the revolts. It is only natural that today‟s communication 
networks are stronger than those of the past. That‟s why more data exists on today‟s 
media simply because of globalization and modernization. The thesis, nonetheless, 
doesn‟t disregard the relevance of the Iranian Revolution. 
The previous points are summed in the coming chapters. Starting with Chapter 
2, it first provides a brief overview on globalization, media and the two revolutions 
(Iranian and Egyptian). For that purpose, a brief overview is also provided on the 
history of the various types of media. In the Egyptian Uprising, the general tool used 
was Social Media (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, etc.). As for the Iranian Revolution, 
the tools used were tapes, audiocassettes, people and interpersonal communication in 
the mosques and souks. Second, the chapter generally deals with both revolutions, along 
with the prerequisites behind an uprising and communication theories. The reasons 
behind the revolutions are the ones commonly deliberated by the scholars but other 
possible perquisites may prevail. The latter are summed in the weird semblance 
between the Egyptian uprising of 2011 and the Iranian revolution of 1978. Generally, 
however, all revolutions share common factors. They form the repetitive patterns of 
revolutions; these factors are the recurrent patterns in all revolutions (Almond, 2011). 
These are further investigated in the thesis. As for the communication theories, they aim 
to examine the nature of the relation between the “mass media” and the people. Media 
9 
 
analysts then work on understanding media‟s impact and constitution (Lamb, n.d.).  
However, no clear theories persist on the role of new social media except the old 
communication theories. Instead, there are attempts manifested in different researches 
or studies to analyze the role of the new social media (such as the one done by 
University of Washington
7
). Still, communication theories could be considered to 
discuss the contribution of the new media to the Egyptian Uprising. A research study 
conducted by Social Media Lab of Ryerson University
8
 discovered that the most 
commonly used communication theories to address social media are the Critical, 
McLuhan‟s Media, Game, and Social Cognitive Theories (Gruzdi, 2015). The chapter, 
however, covers Castell‟s9 “Communication Power” book, along with, Lasswell10 and 
                                                          
7
 See: New study quantifies use of social media in Arab Spring by Catherine O'Donnell: 
http://www.washington.edu/news/2011/09/12/new-study-quantifies-use-of-social-media-in-arab-spring/ 
8
 It is a “research laboratory” at Ryerson University in Toronto, Canada. Its main focus is to study the 
ways in which social media is altering people communication methods, information dispersion; business 
formation and communities‟ creation disseminate information. Second, it also considers the manners in 
which these changes effect the configuration of today‟s society (social, economic and political bases), 
see: http://socialmedialab.ca/ 
9
 He is a Spanish sociologist who was most known for his on the Information Age books that stressed on 
the shift from an “Industrial society to an Informational one”, i.e. the appearance of the “network 
society”. See: https://mediaecologies.wordpress.com/2010/05/31/manuel-castells-communication-power/  
10
 Famous for applying psychology to politics through constructing a “political system” on the basis of 
Natural Sciences paradigms, see: http://itc-maribor.blogspot.com/2012/01/harold-lasswell.html 
10 
 
Mcluhan‟s11communication models. Other old scholarly works are, for instance, the 
models of Aristotle and Shannon-Weaver. Aristotle stressed on the one delivering the 
message, the message, the content, and the ones receiving the message. Weaver and 
Shanon , on the other hand, focused on: where the messages were attained, the intention 
of the sender, the message itself , the medium, recipient and receiver‟s way of 
comprehending the memo (Chand, n.d.). It must be noted that the mentioned studies do 
not present all the prevailing examinations on communication nor the schools of 
thought or the types of communication. As for the more recent work, in the aftermath of 
“the Arab Spring” for instance, there was a study published by sage entitled “Social 
Media and the Arab Spring: Politics Comes First.”12 This study was carried by Gadi 
Wolfsfeld, Elad Segev and Tamir Sheafer
13
. 
Afterwards, chapter 3 applies the previous works through considering the media 
used by the revolts in the Egyptian Uprising of 2011 and Iranian Revolution of 1978. 
This chapter mainly aims to examine media in the context of the revolutions through 
considering the media used, along with, the governmental restrictions on such 
                                                          
 
11
 He was one of the leading “communication theorists” and a professor at Toronto University. See: 
http://www.biography.com/people/marshall-mcluhan-9393821 
12
 See: DOI: 10.1177/1940161212471716 January 2013 The International Journal of Press/Politics 2013 
18: 115 originally published online 16 Gadi Wolfsfeld, Elad Segev and Tamir Sheafer Social Media and 
the Arab Spring : Politics Comes First : http://www.arifyildirim.com/ilt508/gadi.wolfsfeld.pdf 
13
 See: DOI: 10.1177/1940161212471716 January 2013 The International Journal of Press/Politics 2013 
18: 115 originally published online 16 Gadi Wolfsfeld, Elad Segev and Tamir Sheafer Social Media and 
the Arab Spring : Politics Comes First : http://www.arifyildirim.com/ilt508/gadi.wolfsfeld.pdf 
11 
 
utilization. In sum, this chapter stresses on the media‟s stance in both revolutions and 
the rate of its utilization. This is important for grasping the real role of media in the 
revolutions. This helps in clearly understanding the nature of media used in each 
revolution.  
Chapter 4 is an analysis build up on the previous chapters. As for the final 
chapter (5), it wraps up the entire thesis by stating the conclusion and the needed further 
recommendations. The latter are the opposing points of view or the critiques since there 
is an intense debate on whether social media can cause a real change. For instance, it is 
noticed that there are still austere human rights abuses in Egypt after the uprising. 
Accordingly, a profound change needs something more than globalization‟s new social 
media. The thesis simply wants to use these critiques as mere proof of the significance 
of media, i.e. media can help in the process of policy change through shedding light on 
the gaps and abuses.  Nowadays nothing can be hidden -- whether truth or untruth -- 
because anyone can fabricate a story on any social media site (Facebook, Twitter, etc.). 
For instance, a commoner can fabricate any story on the social media sites and still gain 
millions of followers. These can form pressure groups against the government thereby 
leading to a possible policy change of their desire. The point is that no matter what 
social media is an important tool that can‟t be underestimated. It may cause a revolution 
with no significant changes, but a revolution in itself is a significant change.  
 In sum then the thesis covers: 
12 
 
1. Chapter 1: general introduction on the paper‟s main focus (the debate around 
social media‟s role in a revolution, purpose and significance of the study, along 
with, comparative methodology advantages and disadvantages). 
2. Chapter 2:  general information on: terminologies, Iranian and Egyptian 
revolutions, uprising prerequisites, communication theories, along with, recent 
works. The methodology of comparative analysis is used here to discuss the 
previous points. 
3. Chapter 3:  theories application on both revolutions through utilizing the 
different scholarly works and graphs. 
4. Chapter 4:  analysis of the previous chapters 2 and 3 through utilizing the 
methodology of comparative analysis. 
5. Chapter 5:  conclusions and recommendations based on the previous chapters 
(the sum up of the whole thesis). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
 
This chapter offers a brief review of terminologies associated with the topic 
under discussion. These are: globalization, social media and revolution. Second, it aims 
to reveal the difference between the two revolutions through stating a general overview 
of both. This is followed by a description of the prevailing similarities of the two 
revolutions. The similarities are revealed not solely in the reasons behind the 
revolutions, but also in other matters. These include: 1) both countries were ruled by 
corrupt despots who detained rules for decades, 2) both revolutions were triggered by 
the novel media of their time, 3) the dynasts (Mubarak and the Shah) were considered 
by Washington as “family friends” (as stated by Hilary Clinton), 4) both countries (Iran 
and Egypt) have compound societies with big inflamed cities and 5) Carter and 
Obama‟s government were both alarmed by the revolutions (Wawro, n.d.). 
Furthermore, both revolutions, as Waltz stated, created a window of opportunity 
because they gave hope for change and a better future (Ewenstein, n.d.). Both Iran and 
Egypt also have strong and repressive militaries. In Egypt the dominant group is the 
military.  It has been asked by the subsequent governments to sustain internal security 
and regime stability. It also delivers employment and social services to young people -- 
especially because of the country‟s yearly double digit unemployment rates. In addition, 
the military has its own companies that produce consumer products, pharmaceuticals, 
and manufactured goods. The military was able to have a tight grip on the economy 
14 
 
because of the large portion of American aid directly feeding into the Egyptian military. 
No one knows the exact amount of those holdings, however, because authoritarian 
regimes sought to make the military‟s economic holdings a highly clandestine affair. As 
a result, records vary widely.  For instance, Hamzawy, a former research director for the 
“Carnegie Middle East Center and political science professor at Cairo University,” 
estimated that the military may control up to 30 percent of Egypt‟s total $180 billion 
economy; however, there are other more conservative estimates as well. For instance, 
Mohamed Kadry Said
14
 estimated it to be more at 8 percent of GDP, or about $15 
billion (Sennot, 2012)
15
.  As for Iran, the National Organization for Intelligence and 
Security, or Savak, was considered to be part of the military since it was tightly 
interrelated with it. It was formed in 1957 with the help of United States and “Israeli 
intelligence officers.” Savak then became a confidential organization. It is generally 
associated with the Shah‟s reign. There is really no precise data on them. The existing 
information, however, reveals that Savak included a full-time workforce of 15,000 
individuals, along with part-time stool pigeons. Its director was considered to be the 
“prime minister for national security affairs.” Second, it was also linked to the “Office 
of the Prime Minister” (Dolan, 2009). They were known for using all types of torture, 
especially against the protestors in the Iranian Revolution and the Shah‟s political 
                                                          
14
 “a retired major general and long-time military analyst for the Al Ahram Center for Political and 
Strategic Studies”, see: Inside The Egyptian military‟s brutal hold on power  by Sennot: 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/foreign-affairs-defense/revolution-in-cairo-foreign-affairs-
defense/inside-the-egyptian-militarys-brutal-hold-on-power/ 
15
 Note: the information covers the condition of the military in Egypt at the time of the uprising.  
15 
 
enemies. As stated by Hiro,
16
 Savak had the power to “interrogate, imprison and 
eliminate opponents without challenge or scrutiny.” In other words, it was given the 
green card to practice all sorts of repressive actions (Research Directorate, Immigration 
and Refugee Board, Canada, 1991).  
The dissimilarity between the two revolutions, on the other hand, is mirrored 
through the media used by the revolts (in the Egyptian Uprising and Iranian 
Revolution). For that purpose, applicable communication theories and general 
information on the media used are discussed here.  
2.1 Terminologies Discussion: 
2.1.1 Globalization: 
Globalization, as a term means that the world is taken as a whole or as one unit. It came 
as a response to societies and economy alternations that developed along with growing 
trade, investment and culture interchange among various nations. It is generally agreed 
that globalization went through two stages. At first, it revolved around the national basis 
(sovereign states, along with, their own economies and culture identities). Now, 
however, globalization is an interrelated world (or "global village") with one universal 
culture (Bieber, 2014). The concept of globalization had and still has impact on various 
elements in the world. This is obvious for instance at the economic and cultural levels in 
the world. Though globalization led to positive effects on the economy (such as more 
efficient markets), it made it harder for the states to control their own economies, 
                                                          
 
16 Hiro, Dilip. Iran Under the Ayatollahs. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987, pp.54, 36. 
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especially those of developing countries. For instance, the expansion of international 
trade is leading to more income inequality (especially for developing countries or non-
industrialized ones). Second, international commerce is controlled by the transnational 
corporations and thus the stress would be on increasing profits disregarding the 
demands that target the developmental levels. This further contributes to the rift 
between the developing and developed world. As for globalization‟s effects on culture 
and communication, it was first manifested in furtherance of the internet by the US and 
then in the current social media (Facebook, Twitter, etc.). Generally, however, 
globalization is considered a threat to cultural diversity because it challenges the local 
markets, traditions and languages (Baylis, Smith and Owens, 2013).  It must be noted, 
however, that the previous points briefly tackle globalization because it‟s not the main 
paper‟s focus but its progress, especially cultural globalization, has led to the powerful 
stance of social media today.  
2.1.2 Social Media: 
As an element of globalization, social media has replaced television, broadcasting, 
movies and the press (the conventional media). Social media, much like globalization, 
has also greatly progressed at different stages. The first social media appeared in 1978 
when BBS or “computerized Bulletin Board System” was created by Ward Christensen 
and Randy Seuss. This early example of social media helped people assimilate 
information among each other and to establish their events (Qeek Squad, n.d.). Still, the 
BBS was a solely local system because only users who were in the same area were able 
to log into it through phone lines (Gilbertson, 2010). The second stage came in the 
1990s when the internet was in its first developmental phase. Alongside this new 
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technology other types of media were formulated such as Geocities and Blogger. The 
former enabled users to establish their websites while the latter established the first 
“blogging communities.” These two creations have further facilitated people‟s lives.  
The third stage, with regard to media development, began in 1997. This period had 
witnessed the creation of AOL, a messaging service in which users chat with each other 
online. The final stage was in 2000 as this period witnessed the creation of the first 
“social network platform,” Friendster. There were almost a million users on that 
network. Friendster nonetheless was replaced by MySpace and Blogger that are 
affiliated with Google. With time, Facebook has substituted these two social media 
venues (Qeek Squad, n.d.). Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and other social sites resemble 
today‟s social media. The new type of media has made it easy for people to intermingle 
among each other through the distributing, creating, and substituting information among 
a cybernetic group of people.  
2.1.3 Revolution: 
In Latin, Revolution means "a turn-around" that brings with it a shift in either 
supremacy or structural configurations. This transformation could be outside the 
political level (e.g. at the metaphysical, cultural and technical bases). The revolutions 
that bring such change are donated as “social revolutions.” An example of such 
insurgency is the “Industrial Revolution” (saylor academy, n.d.).  Revolutions greatly 
differ in the tactics used, period, and the dogmas that created them.  The aftermath of 
insurgencies yields transformations in the ethos, economy, and “socio-political” 
institutes. The latter has led scholars to be interested in studying revolutions. First, 
insurgencies were approached from a psychological standpoint, especially those of 
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Europe. Contemporary considerations, however, have incorporated international 
happenings with different social science outlooks (such as sociology and political 
science) (saylor academy, n.d.). Revolution, as a notion in social science, has different 
connotations. They could be found in three chief studies on revolutions. These works 
have considered revolutions to be both distinct historical happenings and the most 
important routes of change that have aided in shaping the modern world today.  The 
first work was released in 1979 by Theda Skocpol's.  Her book (“States and Social 
Revolutions‟‟) considers revolutions through checking the scope of change in the 
society and the demolition of the old one. Skocpol mainly stressed on the correlation 
between revolutions and states. Her main focus was on tackling the ways in which 
interstate rivalry weakens states and thus leads to the possibility of a revolution to arise. 
The second work is the one of J. B. Barrington-Moore's, “The Social Origins of 
Dictatorship and Democracy,” which was published in 1967.  In his book, he referred to 
how USA and England have paved the way to modernity through the “industrialized 
war” of 1861-5.  Moore considered this to be a revolution. His argument was that 
revolutions can‟t but be ferocious passages to a modern society. The third work is Karl 
Griewank‟s “Der Neuzeitliche Revolutionsbegrijf, Entstehung und Entwicklung.”  
Griewank has considered the evolvement of revolution as a term through examining its 
first constitutional foundations vis-a-vis the updated interpretation which resulted from 
the French revolution.  This allowed him to discover that state jurisdiction is essential in 
revolutions, which meant that revolutions could only be identified after the emergence 
of the modern state. The different scholarly works on revolutions have yielded 
contending presuppositions on revolutions -- or the comprehension of revolution as a 
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happening (saylor.org, n.d.). In International Relations (IR), few studies on matters 
related to revolutions (such as the diagnostic ones) are found. These were mainly the 
conducts of Kissinger, Rosecrance, Wight, Rosenau
17
, Kim and Calvert. Their work has 
persisted throughout time. Generally, however, revolutions are indirectly tackled in IR, 
i.e. a diagnostic approach, such as Rosenau‟s work “Turbulence in World Politics: A 
Theory of Change and Continuity” could be re-considered in a way to study revolutions. 
Rosenau stated that: “turbulent form of change and turbulent situations (of 
globalization) tend to be marked by quick responses, insistent demands, temporary 
coalitions, and policy reversals, unlike conventional diplomatic or organizational 
situations.”18  In other words, Rosenau is implying that drastic transformations require 
instant reactions (such as formation of new alliances). This change can then be related 
to that caused by revolutions. James Rosenau has also provided in his work a similar 
taxonomy of revolution through defining three categories of wars. There is a debate, 
however, on whether these can be considered as taxonomy of revolutions (Lipsky, n.d.).  
Rosenau for instance believed that “palace revolution or Latin American caudillismo” is 
an example of personnel wars -- wars that are initiated to take over the prevailing 
political power and its organizational functions. Huntington,
19
 on the other hand, has 
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 See: Concept of change and James N. Rosenau: Still international relations? By Murat Gül E-mail: 
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Remaking of World Order”, he was an expert in “defense” and international doings. See: 
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grouped revolution into four categories. These are: the “internal war,” “the 
revolutionary coup,” “the reform coup,” and “the palace revolution.” Huntington‟s 
“internal war” category, however, is dissimilar to that found in the previous scholarly 
readings. It is instead replaced by “mass revolution.” The latter is parallel to Rosenau‟s 
structural wars; wars in which the revolts intend to present societal and fiscal 
transformations in the society. “Palace revolution” is also analogous with Rosenau‟s 
personnel wars.  As for the revolutionary and reform coups, they could be considered as 
authority wars.  An example of a revolutionary coup is the insurrection of Kemal 
Ataturk‟s revolution in Turkey. As for the reform coup, it is exemplified by the 
Argentinian 1955 coup. These two revolutions are compared and contrasted based on 
the range of political configuration transformation. The Young Turks aimed to 
completely change the political authority that eventually led to formation of a republic 
instead of the Ottoman Empire. In the Argentinian coup, however, the rebellions wanted 
to restructure -- especially because of Peron‟s failure to handle the economy (Tanter and 
Midlarsky, n.d.). Other scholars have also classified revolutions. Two of these scholars 
are Tocqueville and Brinton. Tocqueville was a French sociologist and political thinker. 
He was mostly known for his influential book, “Democracy in America.” It deals with 
individualism. He approached the study of revolution by undertaking an empirical 
tactic. To him, a revolution takes place when the elite pledge extreme shift at the 
societal, “political,” and fiscal levels, i.e. they would be toppled down after such drastic 
change.
20
 As for Crane Brinton‟s, he is an American and Idea‟s historian. In his book, 
“Anatomy of Revolution,” he considered the factors that signal the beginning of a 
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revolution. Brinton has compared between coup d‟état and main revolutions (e.g. 
French and Russian revolutions). The former is when the old elite are substituted.  This 
is accompanied by shifts at the fiscal, societal and “political” levels.21 
2.2 General Overview on the Revolutions: 
2.2.1 Iranian Revolution: 
The Iranian Revolution is an assembly of protests with these protestors 
representing all facets of society (i.e. students and journalists). It was mainly, however, 
the revolution of the working class and the poor against the shah‟s regime which, due 
to his brutal actions, had resulted in severe economic crisis. The crisis was caused by 
the huge drop in economic profits from oil, the country‟s core source of revenue. 
Therefore, the chief reason behind the 1979 revolution was the state‟s tight grip on the 
Iranian economy as it was the main wealth holder to the extent that it was the principal 
dispenser of wealth. This greatly affected all features of communal and financial life. 
First of all, the working class was affected by the developmental strategies subsidized 
by the state. This, ultimately, led to the division of the population. Second, the state 
restricted and politicized market, along with, economic materials. Back then, the Shah 
was blamed for the deteriorating conditions and the state‟s tight control on the Iranian 
economy. He was considered to be the obvious force behind the inconsistencies in 
Iranian society and the poor circumstances that most Iranians encountered. This led 
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different sections of the Iranian population to constantly complain about the conditions 
they were living in. On the other hand, there were economic organizations and actors, 
such as the bazaars, coming together against the state and the Shah (Cullis, 2014). Still, 
there are other causes that led to the revolution. One of the causes is the Shah‟s 
initiation of laws that gave more rights to women. This, along with his cooperation with 
the West, angered the Ulamas (Cohen, 2009). Despite the fact that there was economic 
growth during Mohammad Reza Shah‟s time, opposition grew against him, especially 
regarding the ways in which he utilized the secret police, Savak, to govern the country. 
The robust Shiite resistance against the Shah had almost caused the ignition of a civil 
war.  The opposition was directed by Ayatollah Khomeini, who was exiled to Iraq and 
later to France.  This is what had formed the start of the Iranian Revolution, especially 
when the Shah left the country and assigned Shapour Bakhitar as his novel prime 
minister.  However, Bakhitar, along with, the “Supreme Army Councils” was not able 
to control the situation. This was the time when action against the Shah‟s followers 
began until Ayatollah Khomeini declared the Islamic republic with a novel constitution. 
This constitution mirrored his ideals of an Islamic government (Bahramitash, n.d.). It 
was Khomeini‟s responsibility to quickly gain control and initiate an opposition since 
the Ulama of Iran were a mystical authority with sovereign rule within Iran. The 
Islamists, headed by Khomeini, took control of Iran through assembling religious 
organizations that on the surface were giving organizations, but behind the scenes were 
the backup systems of the Islamists (i.e. their supporters). Not only did these 
organizations provide help to the poor, but they also enticed volunteers from various 
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universities. Simply, these organizations were formed for the sake of attracting mass 
numbers of people for the protests (Paladin, 2011).   
2.2.2 Egyptian Uprising: 
The Egyptian Revolution of 2011 was a revolution against Hosni Mubarak, the former 
Egyptian President (Simmons, 2013).  It was assembled by the youth, especially those 
from conflicting parties (Editors of Britannica Encyclopedia, n.d.). The protestors 
ranged from young, erudite students to doctors, lawyers, judges, Christians, women and 
TV workforces (Mainwaring, 2011). The revolution intensified when Mubarak refused 
to withdraw from power (Diehn, 2013). After the conflict with local authorities, an 
Egyptian man burnt himself next to the parliament. Two days later another, unemployed 
man burnt himself. Afterwards, there were wider protests against redundancy and 
political subjugation in Mubarak‟s regime.  One of the protests was called “Day of 
Anger.” On that day, many quarreled with the police. At the time, the opposition leader, 
Mohamed ElBaradei, returned to Egypt. He is a “Nobel Peace Prize” winner and former 
head of the “U.N. nuclear regulatory agency.” His attendance invigorated the protesters.  
At the same time, the “Muslim Brotherhood,” the country‟s biggest resistance group, 
encouraged its young followers to join the demonstrations. Later president Hosni 
Mubarak announced on television that he will assign a novel government. However, he 
didn‟t take into consideration any of the chief reforms that the citizens had asked for 
with regard to penury, price increases and unemployment. Afterwards, Egypt‟s military 
increased its belligerence through controlling parts of the capital, but later the army offi-
cials accepted demonstrations as an expression of citizens‟ “freedom of speech.” They 
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promised not to use potency against the protestors. Nevertheless, this didn‟t signal the 
end of aggression since demonstrators clashed with Mubarak supports, especially when 
Mubarak announced that he will not resign. In fact, Mubarak ensured that the anti-
government demonstrations in “Tahrir Square” were violent and bloody (The Los 
Angeles Times, 2012). It must be mentioned, however, as stated by Mustafa, that the 
Egyptian uprising didn‟t happen spontaneously like the Tunisian one. Instead, it was 
prearranged from an earlier time. This is shown when the “National Coalition of 
Change” had suggested to revolt on January 25, 2011 in Tahrir Square to ask for 
political modifications. At that time, Mubarak had a speech to present in honor of the 
police (the “Police Day”)22 (Khamis and Vaughn, 2011).  
2.3 Causes behind revolutions: 
Generally speaking scholars agree on the main cause behind a revolution to be 
the wearing out of the “social order.” Goldstone,23 for instance, believed revolutions to 
be a process by which a society falls into unstable status. His five prerequisites of 
society‟s disequilibrium also mirror those of the other scholars. These elements are: 
economic burdens, hostility amid elites, nationals‟ growing disapproval of the 
unfairness, suitable international relations and the existence of an opposition dogma. 
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23 He is public policy professor at George Mason University. One of his books is: “Revolution and 
Rebellion in the Early Modern World”. See: http://jackgoldstone.gmu.edu/ 
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The prevalence of such conditions makes it hard to sustain the existing order and thus 
this ultimately leads to the instability of the society. This aids in developing the 
revolution process through producing revolts, especially when unexpected incidents 
take place. Crane Brinton on the other hand, has offered illustrations on “structural 
prerequisites,” along with, general reasons behind a revolution (as stated in the below 
table 1, p.26). Generally, the “structural and transient” aspects together are considered 
to be revolutions prerequisite. The former causes are considered to be of comprehensive 
and longstanding nature. They then emasculate the societal institutes. They involve 
changes in anthropology, international relations, along with, exclusion practices (against 
assemblies) configurations. As for the transient reasons behind a revolution, they are 
practices carried out by certain persons or assemblies that stimulate the continuity of a 
revolution through the adherence of the revolts to undertaking additional engagements. 
Such reasons are loss in combat and protests against the state‟s power.  Structural 
causes nonetheless are the scholars‟ main focus because they yield to the volatility that 
is considered by them to be the main reason behind insurgencies (Satkiewicz and 
Alalykin, n.d.).  It is noticed however that there are repetitive patterns of revolutions or 
recurrent patterns in all revolutions. These elements are: demographics, foreign policy 
and genuineness of the state, agony and exploitation (Grill and DeFronzo, 2011). After 
all, as Trotsky (“revolutionary Russian Marxist and theorist”) stated, if poverty was the 
reason behind revolutions, there would always be revolutions because of the high rate of 
poverty in the world (Almond, 2011). Violent death, nonetheless, is the most important 
recurring element. The latter has been the most conjoint spark for “radicalizing” 
dissatisfaction in the revolutions of the past 30 years. 
26 
 
Table 1: Crane Brinton’s “Structural,” along with, General Reasons: 
“Structural Reasons” 24 General Reasons25 
The persistence of the conflict amid 
powers (monarchy and those with lesser 
power) on managing the authority and 
profits 
People from all social classes are 
discontented  
  
 
 
The vast difference in the level of 
affluence  amid the rich and poor 
People felt restless and held down by 
unacceptable restrictions in society, 
economy or government 
 
Commercial and Industrial Revolutions 
effects  
 
The scholars and thinkers gave up on the 
way their society operates 
 
The persistent expansion of the middle 
class due to suburbanization, commercial, 
and industrial growth 
The government doesn‟t respond to the 
needs of its society 
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which he considered the factors that signal the beginning of a revolution. See: “Crane Brinton‟s 
The Anatomy of Revolution (1938)”: 
http://faculty.sfhs.com/lesleymuller/ap_euro/Abs_Cons/crane_brinton.pdf 
 
 
27 
 
 
The persistent growth of the working class 
(19th century or later) 
 
The government is unable to get enough 
support from any group to save itself 
“Structural unemployment and re-
employment”  as a consequence to the 
shifts in the production processes 
 
The government cannot organize its 
finances correctly and is either going 
bankrupt or trying to tax heavily or 
unjustly 
 
Bigger political consciousness  
 
 
Fiscal issues especially those resulting 
from war such as financial liability 
 
Deprivation amid the  lower class 
 
 
A debase government  
Financial emergency  
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Table 2: Preconditions of the “Iranian Revolution of 1978” according to Brinton: 
People 
from all 
social 
classes 
discontent 
People felt 
restless and 
held down by 
unacceptable 
restrictions in 
society, 
economy or 
government 
The 
scholars 
and 
thinkers 
evaluate 
the way 
their 
society 
operates 
The 
government 
doesn’t 
respond to 
the needs of 
its society 
The 
government 
is unable to 
get enough 
support 
from any 
group to 
save itself 
The 
governme
nt cannot 
organize 
its 
finances 
correctly 
and is 
either 
going 
bankrupt 
or trying 
to tax 
heavily or 
unjustly 
The 1979 
revolution 
was a 
revolution 
held by the 
entire 
society 
against the 
state
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People were 
annoyed by the 
Savak, or 
secret police 
In the first 
phases of 
the Iranian 
Revolution, 
motivated 
academians 
started 
questioning 
the Shah‟s 
Most of the 
budget was 
allocated to 
providing 
services for 
the wealthy 
populaces of 
northern 
Tehran. As 
 The Shah‟s 
relation with 
the Carter 
administratio
n is what 
initially 
caused the 
revolution 
i.e. the 
High taxes 
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regime
27
 for the slums, 
they were 
suffering 
from a lack 
of services 
(such as 
electricity 
and public 
transportatio
n). This 
difference 
was a shame 
to a regime 
that had 
pledged for 
the start of a 
'great 
civilization.‟  
28
 
alliance with 
the west led 
to the 
revolution 
and thus the 
government 
couldn‟t 
resort to 
Western 
support to 
save itself 
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Table 3: Preconditions of the “Egyptian Uprising of 2011” according to Brinton’s 
model: 
People 
from all 
social 
classes are 
discontent 
People felt restless 
and held down by 
unacceptable 
restrictions in 
society , economy 
or government 
The 
scholars 
and 
thinkers 
give up 
on the 
way their 
society 
operates 
The 
governme
nt doesn’t 
respond to 
the needs 
of its 
society 
The 
governme
nt is 
unable to 
get 
enough 
support 
from any 
group to 
save itself 
The 
governme
nt cannot 
organize 
its 
finances 
correctly 
and is 
either 
going 
bankrupt 
or trying 
to tax 
heavily or 
unjustly 
 Although 
Egypt‟s 
“elite class” 
(wealthy 
businessme
n) profited 
greatly 
from 
Mubarak‟s 
privatizatio
n dogmas, 
they were 
against 
Mubarak‟s 
backing of 
foreign 
-  the 
doggedness 
of governing 
by fear for 
thirty years, 
for example, 
through the 
utilization of 
“emergency 
law” 
- embargo on 
dogmatic 
rights and 
civic 
liberties and 
absence of  
 Egypt‟s 
intellectua
ls 
(doctors, 
lawyers, 
jurists, 
instructors
, lecturers, 
novelists, 
artists, 
journalists
, 
engineers, 
and civil 
servants) 
were 
 No  The US 
governmen
t, a key 
supporter 
of 
Mubarak‟s 
regime and 
Egypt in 
general, 
did not 
take a 
strong 
stance but 
later (when 
the 
uprising 
In the five 
years 
before the 
uprising, 
the “tax 
base” 
augmented 
considerab
ly in 
Egypt. 
However, 
the tax 
system 
was not 
created for 
the benefit 
of the poor 
and middle 
class .
33
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investment 
since it 
endangered 
their 
admission 
to Egyptian 
capital and 
markets. 
The poor, 
both 
farmers and 
urbanites, 
suffered 
from the 
growing 
financial 
adversities 
which were 
an outcome 
of 
Mubarak‟s 
“social 
welfare” 
strategy.
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fair 
elections  
- the epidemic 
corruption  
- redundancy 
- price 
increases on 
food  
- low 
income
30
 
mainly 
against 
numerous 
strategies 
of Hosni 
Mubarak
31
 
was at its 
peak) it 
supported 
having a 
novel 
regime in 
Egypt.
32
 
i.e. Egypt 
already 
had a 
support but 
that 
support 
backed 
having a 
novel 
regime in 
Egypt. 
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   Why Did Mubarak fall?: Cross-Class Opposition to the Ancient Regime in Egypt: 
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Note:  The information in the above tables is taken from the literature review and from 
other web articles. 
2.4 Message Dispersion: 
2.4.1 Iranian Revolution: 
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Khomeini relied on music cassettes to disperse his message. He tremendously 
utilized audiocassette technology to disseminate his memorandum. He first attained the 
tapes from people who visited Najaf, Iraq, where he was living in exile. But later when 
relations between Iraq and Iran improved, more tapes were brought to him by the 
thousands of visitors allowed to come in.  Still Khomeini had easier access to the 
techniques of recording and conduction when he was exiled to Paris in 1978.  There 
were always two tape machines running in his house. Then, these were replicated for 
transportation to Iran through global telephone. Tehran music stores have also helped 
distribute these religious tapes through purposely placing them with what people were 
buying (Rahaghi, 2012). There are two additional tools for spreading the information. 
One was through using the “printing press.” Anyone who enjoyed financial affluence 
was permitted to spread their ideas through the “printing press.” Still, this method was 
only restricted to the upper stratums of society. After all, individuals who were not 
well-backed had no money to pay for printing their work. Therefore, the spread of ideas 
was limited to certain groups in society (Mag, n.d.). The final form of distribution was 
either through interpersonal communication in the mosques and souks or via printed 
materials such as booklets and brochures.  This third method was heavily utilized to 
synchronize action and disseminate ideas, especially in the form of “open letters.” The 
letters were used by several groups such as solicitors, assemblies from the “middle 
class,” journalists and laborers. In the letters, the lawyers revealed their opposition to 
the judicial system. As for the writers, they wanted to eliminate “censorship” through 
giving a bigger role to their association. Workers on the other hand, had asked for 
corruption elimination -- as had been Khomeini‟s request. This early media was 
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generally adaptable and effective in the revolution. It first aided in enabling acute 
structural features of the revolution. Second, it offered the real story of the revolution 
because it stated what was really happening.  The latter was also facilitated by two 
covert news services: “Strike Bulletin” and “Solidarity.” “Strike Bulletin” wrote about 
the happenings abroad and sought to bring aid for the opposition in Iran. “Solidarity,” a 
weekly press release, was assembled by the “National Organization of Universities” 
(Rahaghi, 2012).  Actually, when the revolution is observed, it could be discovered that 
the tools used to ignite it were the collective actions of the writers, publishers, lawyers, 
merchants and academics. They formed groups that advocated freedom of thought and 
the abolition of military tribunals. The strategy was gathering a huge number of people 
against the Shah through the formation of groups (Sepheri, n.d.). 
2.4.2 Egyptian Uprising: 
In the Egyptian Revolution the tool used was Social Media such as Facebook. It 
shaped the protest through aiding group creation. Evidently, people didn‟t collect each 
other, but it is Social Media that joined them together. A study conducted by “Dubai 
School of Government” on the main utilization of Facebook at the time of the protests 
revealed that 30.93% of Egyptian protesters used this media to raise awareness and 
29.55% utilized it to form actions. On the other hand, only 12.37% of the Egyptian 
people used it for entertainment purposes (Eaton, 2013). The density of connections was 
attained in Egypt then through “vertical threshold” and “horizontal expansion.” The 
former means that though there is a minute penetration of social media in Egypt, it was 
bypassed by being scaled vertically through Facebook. In the Egyptian uprising, for 
instance, the Facebook page established in the name of Khaled Said, a man cruelly 
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murdered by the previous regime, became a focal point for the protestors.  These revolts 
were really motivated by the Tunisian uprising that removed Ben Ali‟s government.  As 
for the latter (“horizontal expansion”), it involves social media aid in expanding the 
lines of Egyptians in Tahrir Square (Mainwaring, 2011). 
2.5 General Overview on Media Used: 
2.5.1 Egyptian Uprising: 
2.5.1.1Facebook: 
Facebook is a “social networking” site that was first initiated in 2004 by Mark 
Zuckerberg. It was first created for university students but soon expanded so that 
anyone could use it to communicate with whomever they want. Users do so through 
sharing pictures, videos and chatting with each other (GCF Global, n.d.). Although 
social media was mostly developed in the US, it did not take long for Facebook to 
become a „global‟ online community. Still, Western citizens form the bulk of Facebook 
users. This puts them in charge of “online globalization” (Kim, 2013). Recent studies, 
however, reveal that the other countries are gradually becoming active social media 
users.  An example of this is the Middle Eastern countries, but the percentages of their 
internet usage vary.  A survey at Northwestern University in Qatar (on internet use in 
these countries) reveals this variance. It indicated:  86% Qatar, 82% Bahrain, 22% 
Egypt, 46% Jordan, 82% Saudi Arabia, 58% Lebanon, 60% Tunisia, 91%  UAE and an 
overall average of 66% (Northwestern University in Qatar , 2013).   
2.5.1.2 Twitter: 
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Twitter is also a social networking site where users display messages as tweets. These 
tweets could be followed by others without the need for any approval. This is unlike in 
Facebook where friend requests must be approved before connecting (Whatls.com, 
n.d.). 
2.5.1.3 YouTube: 
It is a site through which people either watch or upload videos without any restriction 
on the subject tackled. It was initiated in 2005 (You Tube, n.d.).  
2.5.1.4 Flickr: 
It is a mobile application that was initiated by Stewart Butterfield and Caterina Fake in 
2004 (Butterfield, and Fake, n.d.). It is a site through which huge numbers of photos are 
shared by people without any expenses (Lowensoln, 2008). Photos could also be 
accompanied by any comments or notes (Spencer, 2006).  
2.5.2 Iranian Revolution:  
 2.5.2.1 Audio cassette: 
It was invented in 1962 by “Philips Company of Netherlands” (Bells, n.d.). It is also 
called “compact cassette” and it allowed people to record without the need of having 
high training or recording skills (Southtree, 2015).   
 2.5.2.2 “Printed materials”: 
 Generally they are bijou in dimension. They deal with information on a specific matter. 
Pamphlets or flyers are considered to be “non-projected audiovisual aids.” They are in 
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paper form -- which can be differently doubled over. They have different aims. 
Pamphlets for instance aim for memo commercializing and addressing community 
matters (Sood, n.d.). 
2.6 Communication Theories (Old Works): 
2.6.1 Castells book “Communication Power”: 
 It relies on his previous “Network Society” models. In this book, Castells 
attempts to create a “power theory” in relevance to the media of the new information 
period. He also considered the connection of “power” to “media.” The media he 
examined was the conventional “mass media” type and the media grounded in the 
internet or, as stated by Castells, “mass-self communication.” Castells considered “mass 
media” to be the mutually dependent media companies since they control the bulk of 
newspapers and TV, along with, radio stations.  “Mass-self communication” on the 
other hand, provides ways of communication dissimilar to those of “mass-media.” For 
example, in modern society, there is a new depiction of connection of power to media. 
Castells also believed that power nowadays is generally defined by regarding the degree 
to which “actors” can impact each other. It is not executed anymore by immense 
“violent” practice. Castells assumed that people take or consider their decisions based 
on the way they process information and by rationality (as referred to in the post 
enlightenment) (Sytaffel, 2010). Second, “mass-self communication” reaches out to the 
international spectators through, for instance, a video on YouTube. It is “self-
communication” since it is created by either professional or nonprofessional subscribers 
(also called “self-generated”). It also has specific discourses “self-directed” and internet 
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bases “self-selected.” It, then, goes with interpersonal and mass communication (Oxford 
University Press, 2010). Castells stated that: “in a world of networked mass 
communication, „one message from one messenger can reach out to thousands, and 
potentially hundreds of thousands‟ as it proliferates through the network society.” In 
other words, Castells is indicating that with today‟s “mass communication” a message 
can be transmitted to a huge number of people.  He also contends that this brings people 
together in one virtual society, the “network society.” This society is based on trust 
since the recipient of information already knows the basis and thus the “wireless 
communication network” becomes a grid of trust. Together, the “communication 
networks” and those of “trust” can form an opposition that counters a recognized 
“target.”  Castells simply believed that current forms of communication are cheap and 
easy to use. This would then encourage more people to utilize them. The huge reliance 
on such media leads them to have more impact than the highest “hierarchies” of the 
state (such as the military).  In Castells‟s own words: “networks constitute the dominant 
morphology of contemporary societies, whereby the availability of cheap 
microelectronics makes such organizational forms more efficient than highly 
hierarchical „pyramids‟ of the state, the military, bureaucracy and traditional 
corporations.”  In sum, Castells wanted to grasp the ways in which small number of 
people can deliver their message to more onlookers. The latter is revealed in the notion 
of “self-mass communication” in which it pledges to provide independence from the 
government and its configurations through more lenient consolidation (Eaton, 2013). 
2.6.2 Harold Dwight Lasswell and McLuhan Models:  
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Lasswell tried to address ways of communication through stressing on: the 
sender (who), the message sent (says what), tool of communication (in which channel), 
receiver (to whom) and the message‟s influence (with what effect).  Lasswell achieved 
the latter by addressing four different types of analysis: 1) “content” (the topic of the 
message); 2) “media” (the medium used to transfer the messages); 3) “audience” (the 
receiver) and 4) “effect” (the message‟s impact). These analyses then mirror Lasswell‟s 
questions (communication theory.org, n.d.).  His model was found to address both 
interpersonal and mass communication (Colombo, 2004). McLuhan has also focused on 
the questions and stages discussed by Lasswell but with different terminologies.  As 
stated by McLuhan, his model (Medium Model) has seven stages: “1) source of 
information, 2) sensing process, 3) sending, 4) flight of information or transportation of 
information, 5) receiving, 6) decision-making and 7) action.‟‟ In other words, it focuses 
on: the source from which the memos were taken, the way they were perceived, the 
medium they were delivered in, the manners in which they were received and the 
reaction of the recipient. As for McLuhan‟s questions, as he stated, they are: “what does 
it enhance, what does it make obsolete, what does it retrieve that had been obsolesced 
earlier, and what does it flip into when pushed to extremes?”34 McLuhan, then, is 
stating that four different aspects must be considered with regard to media. These are 
media‟s: augmentation, over passing of certain matters while still retaining some of the 
elements and changes in extreme case scenarios (Ownkelly.net, n.d.).  McLuhan has 
mainly believed that the “medium” resembles the memo (Chand, n.d.).  It is a “symbolic 
environment of any communicative act,” i.e. it is the virtual world of the 
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 In McLuhan book “Laws of Media”, see: http://www.owenkelly.net/984/mcluhans-tetrads/ 
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communication action. Second, he assumed that networks are dissimilar in their 
compositions and the way in which they impact the various point of views. For instance, 
networks must be considered to check the ways in which media affects the general 
public and ethos (University of Twente, n.d.). His model was really an attempt to 
comprehend the impact of the media of his time (such as “print”) (Sandstrom, 2012). 
Lasswell and McLuhan‟s models are simply used here since they clearly state the 
components found in any communication theory. They basically form the must-have 
models that are needed for the comprehension of communication, especially media. The 
below figures (1 and 2) mirror the elements (as mentioned earlier) of Lasswell and 
McLuhan models.  
Figure 1 Lasswell Model
35
: 
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See: http://communicationtheory.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/western-models-1024x287.jpg 
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Figure 2 McLuhan’s “medium model”36: 
 
2.7 Recent Works:  
2.7.1 “Contextualism approach” in Sage’s article: 
It considered social media in relevance to “collective action” through taking the 
Arab Spring as a case study. For that purpose, it stressed on the “contextualism 
approach.” Contextualists, through their comparative methodology, stress on the 
political, societal, and fiscal differences‟ influence on the role of social media in 
collective action. This is resembled in the two theoretical approaches‟ focus on the 
political environment. “The first theoretical principle, politics comes first analytically, 
states: one cannot understand the role of social media in collective action without first 
                                                          
36
See: http://skyeome.net/wordpress/?p=59 
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taking into account the political environment in which they operate.” In other words, 
social media can only be comprehended when the political surrounding of the collective 
action (or group of people) is considered. In this analysis, two features must be 
considered: 1) the degree of unrestricted and uncensored access to social media and, 
along with 2) people‟s enthusiasm. The second aspect is absent in a wealthy context in 
which people somehow have easy access to internet (used solemnly for entertainment). 
People in this environment would then be uninterested in politics. Yet, if this matter is 
considered “cross-nationally,” a negative association appears between the degree of 
communication technology available in a particular country and the level of 
demonstration. The mere existence of various political environments entails that the 
higher the level of internet and social media penetration, the lesser the degree of protest.  
Here, then, a question is raised on the role of the novel media in the uprisings. It is 
argued that they must only be regarded as significant tools for protest when there is 
enough access and enthusiasm. “The second principle, politics comes first 
chronologically states that: a significant increase in the use of the new media is much 
more likely to follow a significant amount of protest activity than to precede it.”  In 
other words, they must first secure a maximization of social media utilization for an 
opposition to take place. The previous notion also exists in the “politics-media-politics 
(PMP) principle.” The PMP principle states that the mantle of the media in a political 
progression must be regarded on the basis of the political context alternations. This is 
because such change affects media‟s execution (Wolfsfeld, Segev and Sheafer, 2013).  
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The next chapter then applies these proposed works on the dissemination 
method (the media used) of the revolts in the Iranian Revolution and the Egyptian 
Uprising.  This sheds light on media‟s real contribution. 
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Chapter Three 
Theory Application 
 This chapter intends to apply the previous media works to the Iranian 
Revolution and Egyptian Uprising. First, a brief application is provided in the below 
tables (1 and 2) and then it is followed by a detailed explanation. Two elements of 
Lasswell and McLuhan‟s Models are central here: transmission channel and effect. 
These are comprehensively explicated in the discussion of “Castells Communication 
Power Theory” and “Contextualism Approach.”  
3.1 Brief Application: 
Table 4: Lasswell and Mcluhan’s Models Application 
Lasswell’s 
Model 
Mcluhan 
Model 
Iranian Revolution  
 
Egyptian Uprising 
Who Information 
source 
Revolts Revolts 
Says what Message Reasons behind revolution Reasons behind 
revolution 
In which 
channel 
Transmitter Audiocassettes, open 
letters, press and 
pamphlets 
Facebook, Twitter, 
YouTube and Flickr 
To whom/ Receiver People to revolt against the People to revolt against 
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receiver government the government 
Effect Destination After a year the Shah was 
removed ) (Libcom.org, 
2006) 
After a month Mubarak 
was removed (Global 
Voices, 2011) 
 
Table 5: Contextualism Approach and Castells Communication Power Theory 
Application 
Works on Media  Iranian Revolution Egyptian Uprising 
Contextualism 
Approach: 
 
A) “politics comes 
first 
analytically”37/enough 
access and enthusiasm 
  
B) “politics comes first 
chronologically” or 
PMP Principle/ 
maximization in social 
media first 
A) enough access: no 
enthusiasm: 
Yes 
B) If applied to the media 
of the time, generally, 
there was no 
maximization of media 
due to their nature and to 
constant restrictions.  
A) enough access: yes 
 enthusiasm: Yes 
B) yes 
                                                          
 
37 “politics comes first analytically” that is social media can be only comprehended when the political 
surrounding of the collective action (or group of people) is considered.  In this analysis, two features must 
be considered the degree of: 1) unrestricted and uncensored right to use of social media and 2) people‟s 
enthusiasm 
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Castells 
Communication 
Power: 
A) Media cheap 
and easy to use 
B) Do media have 
more impact 
than the 
highest 
“hierarchies” 
of the state? 
C) Is there a 
“virtual trust?” 
D) Professional or 
nonprofessiona
l subscribers 
(“self-
generated”) 
(Oxford 
University 
Press, 2010) 
 
E) Specific 
discourses 
(“self-
directed”) and 
internet bases 
(“self-
selected”). 
(Oxford 
University 
A) Audiocassettes, 
open letters and 
pamphlets were 
cheap  
Press wasn‟t cheap 
These media are 
easy in nature but 
not in Iran since 
they were 
smuggled. 
B) No 
C) No (another form 
of trust) 
D) No doesn‟t apply 
here 
E) No doesn‟t apply 
here 
A) Cheap: Yes 
Easy to use: 
Yes even 
when internet 
was closed in 
Egypt 
B) Yes 
C) Yes 
D) Yes: 
subscribers on 
social media 
sites 
(individuals 
or groups) 
E) Yes: revealed 
throughout 
the revolution, 
i.e. through 
protestors 
forming and 
organizing 
their 
discourses, 
along with 
choosing the 
right internet 
base 
(especially 
after internet 
closure in 
Egypt). 
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Press, 2010) 
 
3.2 Detailed Explanations: 
3.2.1 McLuhan Model: 
Considering McLuhan‟s assumption that networks must be checked in order to depict 
media‟s effect (University of Twente, n.d.), it is revealed that new social media has a 
bigger impact than conventional media. Social Media‟s power rests in its ability to 
instantly and quickly convey messages that aid in group formation. This is especially 
shown through considering the media used in the past. Back then, the media was filtered 
which means that only when something appeared on the cover page or the evening 
broadcast was it taken to be significant. This is different today because anybody can 
newscast without requesting any approval. The previous points prove why social media 
is undertaking a growing role in whittling happenings.  It is a chain starting with a small 
cluster of zealous people. Those people will influence the uncommunicative individuals, 
along with, making others take notice by participating in the protests.  This is how, in a 
matter of seconds, we see millions joining in the protests (Stall, 2014). Twitter, for 
instance, enabled messages to be dispersed to a huge number of people within minutes. 
A “US-based market-research firm, Pear Analytics,‟‟ has discovered that the revolts 
mainly tweeted about the recent updates (at political and limpidity levels), changes 
happening and assembling. Tweets were simply not covering unworthy matters 
anymore (such as an artist‟s show) (Sedra, 2013). That‟s why in a mere month Mubarak 
was removed on February, 11, 2011 (Global Voices, 2011). On the other hand, the Shah 
of Iran was removed a year after the revolution had started (from 1978-9) (Libcom.org, 
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2006).  Figures 3 and 4 below explain the latter point. In the Egyptian Uprising, four 
demonstrations in about a month‟s time (January 25 and 28, along with, February 2 and 
11) were able to remove the government. As for the Iranian Revolution, eight 
demonstrations in a year (in February 1979) were capable of toppling the Shah‟s 
regime, i.e. at the time when Khomeini was allowed to return back to Iran (Global 
Nonviolent Action Database, n.d.). This indicates that the rallies in the Egyptian 
Uprising have stronger impact. This is due, as shown before, to the network used in the 
revolutions. Indeed, social media in the Egyptian Uprising gave an importance to the 
demonstrations through the manner by which it was conveying messages and covering 
what‟s happening on the ground. The Egyptian people simply didn‟t need more riots to 
topple the Mubarak regime.  
Figure 3: Egyptian Uprising Progress 
 
             Demonstrations in January                 Demonstrations in February                
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Figure 4: Iranian Revolution Progress 
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 Global Nonviolent Action Database. (n.d.). Iran. Retrieved from 
http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/iranians-overthrow-shah-1977-79 
 
1978 
demonstrati
ons 
January 
A government editorial in a 
newspaper accused anti-regime clerics 
of working with communists and the 
Ayatollah Khomeini of licentious 
behavior and of being a British spy. In 
Qum, the headquarters of the ulama 
(clergy), seminaries and bazaars 
closed in protest" 
February 
"peaceful demonstrations 
occurred in twelve cities on the 
fortieth-day anniversary of the 
death of the Qum student" 
March 
"attendees of a commemorative 
religious service in Yazd were 
energized by the words of a fiery 
preacher, who inspired them to 
take to the streets shouting 
“Death to the Shah. 
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3.2.2 “Contextualism Approach”: 
3.2.2.1 Egyptian Uprising: 
A) “Politics Comes First Analytically” (enough access and enthusiasm): It could be 
discovered that there were enthusiastic people for an opposition to take place and easy 
access to the novel media (though there were restrictions by the government).  A report 
done by “the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG)”40 revealed that41 23.2% of 
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 Global Nonviolent Action Database. (n.d.). Iran. Retrieved from 
http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/iranians-overthrow-shah-1977-79 
40
 It‟s an autonomous “federal agency” that check US global media and at the same time it‟s a board that 
controls these broadcasts (of the global media). See: http://www.bbg.gov/about-the-agency/ 
41
 Note: these percentages were taken weekly 
1978 demonstrations 
countinued 
May 
“Again, Khomeini and 
Shari‟atmadari encouraged 
Iranians to attend services 
forty days later" 
June 
"the urban poor and working 
class people joined what had 
previously been an upper-
middle class movement.” 
October 
"on October 6 (when 
Khomeini was expelled to 
Paris) and October 16 (the 
fortieth day after Black 
Friday). " 
December 
"a giant wave of 
demonstrators shouted, “God 
is Great”  
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Egyptians access internet weekly, but these are active users. These users have most 
probably accessed the Internet to attain the most recent news (80.1%) and to watch 
online videos (70.3%). Second, only 20.8% of Egyptians have utilized a social network 
in which 84.9% of them are “active users” on these sites. The striking aspect of these 
data is that though Egypt has the lowest percentage of internet usage, these users are 
energetic (BBG, n.d.). The proof of this is the Egyptian Revolution by itself because it 
shows that social media, as a component of globalization, can help in the uprisings. The 
Egyptian revolts had enough access to social media. This is, for instance, mirrored in 
the eight million viewers on YouTube in the early phases of the uprising, irrespective of 
communication blockage (Sedra, 2013). The revolts were able to surpass governmental 
restrictions initiated as a way to counter the opposition. These repressions ranged from 
shutting the internet down, disabling mobile infrastructures, detaining rebels, 
obstructing blogs, closing newspapers to holding back the “satellite signals” (Freedom 
House, 2012). The strategies used by the Egyptian revolts to overpass these tight 
controls were, for instance, through utilizing techniques such as “Hotspot Shield and 
Tor.” These two tools shield a user‟s identity even when online. The revolts have even 
relied on “proxy server websites” to evade state‟s control, especially before twitter jam. 
The government has also undertaken more severe actions that can be summed in the 
closing of the internet and mobile admittance. This shutdown persisted for a week, but 
activists were able to overcome it by relying on “FTP (file transfer protocol) accounts” 
to disseminate the videos to the global organizations. They even took advantage of the 
landlines to use the internet of adjacent countries, i.e. modems were used to dial 
international numbers. This was a dawdling way of connection, but tweets were still 
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sent successfully. Revolts have even sneaked into “satellite phones and modems.” A 
BBC report stated that many modems prevailed in their tweets. Second, it stated that not 
all Egyptian phones were able to make an international call to connect to the modems. 
As a response, Manalaa, an Egyptian blog, stated the ways in which mobiles, Bluetooth 
technology and laptops could be utilized to dial up a number. The report also noticed 
that Noor internet service was still operating at the time of the uprising. It was used by 
the Western companies and “Egyptian Stock Exchange.” The users of this service 
removed WiFi passwords in order for others to take advantage of this internet service. 
As for mobile shutdown, the revolts used different “message centres” that allowed the 
people to still utilize Twitter and text. The demonstrators have also benefited from 
global aid endeavors. For instance, Twitter and Google provided “Speaker-2-Tweet” 
that allowed phone dialing and listening to tweets without the need of the internet (El 
Tantawy and Wiest, 2011).  Therefore, the revolts‟ utilization of the “social-networking 
websites” enabled them to beat such repressive actions by the government. This 
explicates the reason behind calling the uprising in Egypt, “the Facebook or Twitter 
Revolution” (Freedom House, 2012). The below figures also mirror the previous points. 
Figure 5 (p.53) indicates that Egypt was one of the countries that created the most 
tweets, i.e. 61% of tweets were from UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and Egypt. The 
tweets -- those of Egypt and of the other countries – intensively covered the uprisings of 
2011 (Interactive Middle East, 2011).  Adding to this figure, a paper formulated by 
Kamal Sedra (the director of “Develop and Institution Support Center”, DISC) stated 
that: the number of Facebook users between January and February 2011 was equal to 
5.5 million users. This data then support the previous points. It also reflect on: 1) 
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Castell‟s model with regard to the media‟s inexpensiveness and easy use, along with, 2) 
media‟s impact being stronger than state‟s hierarchies (Eaton, 2013).  
 
Figure 5 “Volume of tweets in the Arab region”42 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
42
 See Twitter Usage in the MENA Region by Interactive Middle East , it‟s “region‟s online destination 
for internet, mobile, and social media news”: http://interactiveme.com/2011/06/twitter-usage-in-the-
mena-middle-east/ 
 (information taken from Arab Social Media Report: 
http://www.arabsocialmediareport.com/home/index.aspx) 
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B) “Politics Comes First Chronologically” or PMP Principle (maximization in social 
media first): Egyptians‟ significant utilization of social media is the result of the 
government‟s undertaking of “information technology” spreading out as a way of 
socioeconomic growth. This goes back to 1999 when the government provided cost free 
internet admittance and lowered the costs of purchasing computers. The government has 
also allowed the development of “internet access centers.” A report done by Internet 
World Stats, an internet marketing research firm, revealed that by February of 2010, 
21% of Egyptians were able to have admittance to the internet
43
. This has ultimately 
allowed a fast “internet penetration” irrespective of illiteracy, beggary and substructure 
restrains (Khamis, Gold and Vaughn, 2012). Bloggers, especially, took a strong stand 
with regard to handling leading issues in the beginning of the 2000s. The blogs were at 
first put out in English, but eventually, more online journals were released in Arabic. 
Consequently, these online journals have reached out more to the nationals
44
.  With 
time, these blogs grew in number. Activists then started relying on new available 
communication technology such as “social media” (Facebook, Flickr and Twitter)45. 
This was evident in 2008 when Egyptian activists used Facebook to make Mahalla 
textile labors go on strike thereby prompting what could be considered one of the 
                                                          
 
43 Internet World Stats. (2011). Miniwatts Marketing Group. Retrieved from 
http://www.internetworldstats.com/africa.htm 
44
 Hamdy, N. (2009). Arab citizen journalism in action: Challenging mainstream media, authorities and 
media laws. Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture, 6(1), 92–112. 
45
 Information taken from Hamdy, N. (2009). Arab citizen journalism in action: Challenging mainstream 
media, authorities and media laws. Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture, 6(1), 92–112. 
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earliest instances of “cyber activism” in Egypt (El Tantawy and Wiest, 2011).  At first, 
the movement coordinators didn‟t rely on Facebook since at that time few were using 
this social site. However, the “Facebook Page” that they created for their protests 
collected 3000 supporters in one day (Rosen, 2011). Eventually it swelled to 70 000 
members (El Tantawy and Wiest, 2011). The protestors have relied on mobiles, journal 
sites, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube to assemble their gatherings and state police 
actions. They also relied on such technology to help those imprisoned by the police 
(Khamis and Vaughn, 2011). The strike, however, was brutally intercepted by the 
state‟s security forces46 (El Tantawy and Wiest, 2011). The state had also arrested one 
of the organizers who was tortured and threatened with rape. After he was released, the 
organizer declared the launching of the April 6 movement. He and the rest of the 
organizers have also examined ways of nonaggressive “civil disobedience” such as 
“Academy of Change,” an Arabic “site.” They were also inspired by the Serbian youth 
movement “Otpor” (Rosen, 2011).  In connection to the movement, a “Facebook group” 
was created: “We Are All Khaled Said.” It was named after the man who was violently 
killed by the police in June 2010, and was assembled before the oppositions 
commenced. The creator of this page was at first unknown but later revealed to be 
Google executive Wael Ghonim. Ghonim aimed to enlighten Egyptians on democracy. 
This page amassed more than 350,000 members (Khamis and Vaughn, 2011). 
Mohammed Mustafa an, “Egyptian political activists,” has also stated other oppositions: 
the “Kefaya movement” and “Ayman Nour‟s political party.”  These have also failed 
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  Information taken from  Hamdy, N. (2009). Arab citizen journalism in action: Challenging mainstream 
media, authorities and media laws. Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture, 6(1), 92–112. 
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because, according to Mustafa, they have only gained limited backing from the people. 
Consequently, they didn‟t yield an actual shift. This, however, doesn‟t apply to the 2011 
uprising since, as stated by Mustafa, the novel technology helped in acquiring a huge 
base of support through easily disseminating the matters related to the protest. He also 
combined new technological facilitation with the “street activism” that first helped in 
initiating the revolution. That kind of activism ensured that internet admittance is 
provided for everyone and secured populace approval for the protest. The latter was 
revealed in acquiring people‟s monogram, as a way of verifying their backing (e.g. Dr. 
ElBaradei‟s “Change Declaration” blueprint). This was achieved through different 
expeditions, house visits and also in creation of smaller extent protests as a practice for 
the more major ones. These were the movements that preceded the uprising. They 
revealed that the “Egyptian tech-savvy activists” were learning ways to surpass the 
state‟s control on the internet. They did so through seeking the help of the “international 
community.” The April 6 Movement, for instance, has technically learned from the 
Italian anarchist party how to utilize “ghost services,” i.e. in the case of online checking, 
researching would be made invisible and thus the process of spreading information and 
assembling gatherings would not be hindered
47
. Others in the movement have 
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 Information taken from Ishani, M. (2011). The hopeful network. Foreign Policy. Retrieved March 24, 
2011http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/07/the_hopeful_network 
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coordinated with the Kenyan NGO, Ushahidi
48
, in order to safely take “raw videos” and 
to secure this content on their mobile phones before publishing it online.  A larger 
number of the protestors, however, had received training from a U.S. NGO
49
 on 
mapping tools utilization (e.g. Google Maps and UMapper) as a way of selecting the 
protest locations
50
 (Khamis and Vaughn, 2011). Maximization in social media use is 
simply then due to the increase in internet access. This is revealed in figures 6 (p.60), 7 
(p.61), 8 (p.62), 9 (p.62) and 10 (p.63). Figure (6) indicates that at the time of the 
uprising, the percentage of Facebook users was 29%. There was an increase in the 
number of users from 12 % (in 2010) to 29%. The figure shows a “positive double digit 
growth” or a dual increase in the number of users in all the countries under examination. 
These countries had a kind of civil strife (Interactive Middle East, 2011). Figure 7 
shows that there were 2, 160,000 tweets during the Egyptian Uprising. This figure is 
considered here to show how active social media use was in the insurrection. It‟s 
irrelevant to focus on the countries with the most tweets (on the basis of figure 7). 
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 “It develops open-source software for information collection and interactive mapping.” See: The 
Hopeful Network: Meet the young cyberactivists who've been planning Egypt's uprising for years by 
Ishani: http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/02/07/the-hopeful-network-2/ 
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    “a group of journalists organized by a U.S. NGO”, see: The Hopeful Network: Meet the young 
cyberactivists who've been planning Egypt's uprising for years by Ishani: 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/02/07/the-hopeful-network-2/ 
50
 Information taken from Ishani, M. (2011). The hopeful network. Foreign Policy. Retrieved March 24, 
2011http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/07/the_hopeful_network 
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Figure (8
51
) reflects upon “Facebook penetration.” In April 2011, the period following 
the uprising of 2011, Facebook penetration rate in Egypt was 7.66%. Egypt was 
considered to be one of the “developing users” (that is the countries in red). This means 
that it is on the road to becoming one of the countries with considerable “Facebook 
penetration rate” (Interactive Middle East, 2011).  It must be mentioned that Twitter had 
a lower penetration rate due to the uprising (as shown in figure 9
52
). This is because at 
the time of the uprising, there was no Arabic interface for twitter. Second, 51% of 
“active twitter users” were in Cairo and 8% in Alexandria. The rest of the percentages 
were haphazardly distributed on the rest of the governorates (Interactive Middle East, 
2011).  Figure (10
53
) clearly shows that the most utilized language used in the uprising 
was Arabic. That is 75.40% of Egyptians used Arabic to communicate via the social 
media networks (Interactive Middle East, 2011). These previous points accordingly 
show Castells previous mentioned assumptions. The first is that social media is easy and 
cheap to use. The second is that media has more impact than the hierarchies of the state. 
It also reveals the assembling of a network society that is based on trust. The creation of 
such societies was cultivated on the basis of social media (Facebook, Twitter, etc.). 
                                                          
51 See: Latest Facebook Statistics in the #MENA (Q1 2011):http://interactiveme.com/2011/06/facebook-
statistics-in-the-mena-middle-east-q1-2011/ 
52
 See: Twitter Usage in the MENA region: http://interactiveme.com/2011/06/twitter-usage-in-the-mena-
middle-east/ 
53 See: Latest Facebook Statistics in the #MENA (Q1 2011):http://interactiveme.com/2011/06/facebook-
statistics-in-the-mena-middle-east-q1-2011/ 
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Castells, in sum, believed that people are joined together in one virtual society, the 
“network society.” This society is based on trust since the recipient of information 
already knows the basis and thus the “wireless communication network” becomes a grid 
of trust. The “communication networks” and those of “trust” together can form an 
opposition that counters a recognized “target” (Eaton, 2013). In the Egyptian Uprising, 
the recognized “target” was the Mubarak regime. The below figure (11, p. 63) clearly 
explicates the previous point (with regard to Castells‟ point on trust) but through taking 
the Tunisian Revolution instead (although this can also be applied to the Egyptian 
Revolution). Figure (11) is simply stating the ways in which social media (specifically 
Facebook) can be an impact in the uprising, especially at the level of creating “creative 
consciousness.” The two social media aspects of rapid: information dispersion and 
people joining helps in forming a common awareness among the revolts (Marzouki and 
Olivier, 2012). This facilitates the formation of network on the basis of trust because 
there is no confusion. The revolts are all on the same page with regard to the source and 
the provision of the information.  
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Figure 6 “The growth rate of Facebook users during the 2011 protests, as 
compared to the same time period in 2010”54 
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 See Latest Facebook Statistics in the MENA (QI 2001) by Interactive Middle East , it‟s “region‟s 
online destination for internet, mobile, and social media news”: 
http://interactiveme.com/2011/06/facebook-statistics-in-the-mena-middle-east-q1-2011/ (information 
taken from Arab Social Media Report: http://www.arabsocialmediareport.com/home/index.aspx) 
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Figure 7 “Number of Tweets in the MENA region (Jan. 1 – March 30, 2011)”55 
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 See Twitter Usage in the MENA Region by Interactive Middle East , it‟s “region‟s online destination 
for internet, mobile, and social media news”: http://interactiveme.com/2011/06/twitter-usage-in-the-
mena-middle-east/ 
 (information taken from Arab Social Media Report: 
http://www.arabsocialmediareport.com/home/index.aspx) 
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Figure 8 “Facebook user penetration in the Arab region, plus Iran, Israel and 
Turkey (Apr. 2011)”: 
 
Figure 9: “Twitter penetration in the MENA (Average between Jan. 1 and March 
30, 2011)”  
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Figure 10 “The Primary Language you used to communicate on Facebook during 
the Civil Movement was”: 
 
 
Figure 11: Social and Political Awareness (Tunisian Uprising Case) ( “This model  
(taken from Marzouki et al., 2012, Cyberpsychology, Behavior and Social Networking, Vol. 15(5), p. 243) 
amplifies the "virtual collective consciousness" (VCC) as a result of intricate contacts between Internet users 
within a social networking podium..56) 
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3.2.2.2 Iranian Revolution 
 
A) “Politics Comes First analytically” (enough access and enthusiasm) along 
with, B) “Politics Comes First Chronologically” or PMP Principle (maximization in 
social media first): There was only enthusiasm with the prevailing of repression. 
Iranians were enthusiastic about revolting. This is revealed in the first stage of the 
insurgency, i.e. University of Tahran students‟ peaceful revolution against American 
president Nixon‟s military backing of the Shah (Global Nonviolent Action Database, 
n.d.). The Shah then demanded the proscription of such oppositions. However, there 
were restrictions that prevailed in first the Shah‟s disregard of the “Press Code of 1963” 
(as shown in table 7). Second, it was in the form of the smuggling of audiocassettes 
(Rahaghi, 2012). The “printing press” used was also limited since only the upper 
classes had access to it. The situation is different with respect to social media because 
everyone can disseminate their concept to thousands and even to billions (Mag, n.d.). A 
general overview of the press‟s condition in the period preceding the revolution must 
first be considered. In that era, the majority of journalists, especially those who were 
professional journalists, had jobs in newspapers related to the government. They 
considered their work to be as “Khedmat”, or way of “service,” similar to that in the 
army. There are also journalists who worked in autonomous press with the purpose of 
educating the people. They either earned their money from undertaking other 
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 See Article by Yousri Marzouki  and Olivier Oullier: Revolutionizing Revolutions: Virtual Collective 
Consciousness and the Arab Spring: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/yousri-marzouki/revolutionizing-
revolutio_b_1679181.html 
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happenings or just relied on their own wealth. These reporters didn‟t operate with the 
state. The 1978–79 Revolution revealed that the Iranian print media is highly inert. 
During that period, there was a massive increase in the state‟s grip over the printing 
media to the extent that Iranians relied on foreign sources to know about the 
occurrences in their own country. The revolution was generally covered by the “Special 
Bulletin” of the governmental “Pars News Agency.” This included the revolts in and 
outside Iran, along with the growing foreign condemnation of the Shah‟s government. 
The national journalists had also reported on the revolution, but usually it was stated 
that the revolts were against the nation. This is revealed in the “Ettela‟at” and 
“Kayhan” newspapers‟ (the “Silent Giants”) dependency on the state “news services” 
(“Pars News Agency, National Iranian Radio and NIRT TV”), i.e. though these two 
newspapers have their individual journalists, they relied on state resources to get the 
information they need. Ettela‟at reached an extent of declaring the difficulty of 
examining information independently especially because of the state‟s restrictions on 
the press (as shown in the below table 6). This limitation on the “printing press” and 
media in general led to the November 5 unrest of the “Iran Radio and TV Network” 
staffs. They revolted especially against the Shah‟s imprisonment of journalists and 
repression movements against the press (Shahbaz, n.d.). At the time, the Media didn‟t 
have more impact than the hierarchies of the state due to its very nature and it wasn‟t 
available to everyone (contrary to what Castells has stated). There is also no virtual 
society, i.e. there was a network society different than that depicted by Castells. It was 
a society not based on the internet, but on the conventional forms of media 
(audiocassettes, newspapers, etc.). Trust, though it existed in such society, was not 
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easily formulated partially because of the state‟s manipulation of the news (as 
mentioned from before). People were in a state of confusion because they did not know 
what exactly was taking place in the revolution. This is explained by Kurzman -- a 
professor of Sociology at University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill -- whose focus is 
on Middle East and Islamic studies) book.  In his book he proposed that "critical mass" 
theory best describes the Iranian case.  This theory indicated the hectic situations under 
which Iranians acted. They only got involved in the protest when they anticipated that 
others will also do the same. Kurzman, through interviews and bystander explanations, 
along with declassifying security documents, recognized the prevalence of the 
overpowering sense of misperception. This confusion has persisted in pre-revolutionary 
Iran and during the protest movements (Yee, 2010).   
Table 6: Press Condition in the Periods:  Preceding and During the Revolution
57
 
1952-3 1963 1974-9 
300 (25 are dailies) 227 (71 closed by the 
government through a 
“cabinet resolution” that 
prohibited the release of 
newspapers in Tehran) 
100 (23 are dailies) in the 
year 1978 
  63 newspapers were 
prohibited by the 
government through the 
same resolution of 1963 (in 
the year 1974). 
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See Journalism in Iran by Hosssein Shahidi, from: 
http://uploadkon.ir/uploads/journalism%20in%20iran.pdf 
67 
 
  Almost 64 out of 100 
newspapers were printed in 
Tehran. They stressed on 
matters related to “health, 
sports, religion, and science” 
(in 1978). 
Six domestic daily 
newspapers (such as 
“Ettela‟at /Information, 
Kayhan /Universe, 
Rastakhiz /Resurgence and 
Ayandegan /Posterity” (in 
year 1978).  
 
Table 7: The Degree of Compliance with the “Press Code of 1963” 58 
Press Code of 1963 Code Application in 1977 
A Journal released for the sake of the 
people must only serve their own 
benefits  
 
 
Missing  
Journalist must not pursue a disdainful 
activity    
 
 
Missing 
Journalism must rely on: a) objectivity, 
b) seeking the truth and c) accurateness. 
 
 
 
Missing 
                                                          
58
 See Journalism in Iran by Hosssein Shahidi, from: 
http://uploadkon.ir/uploads/journalism%20in%20iran.pdf 
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Publication should only say the truth 
that suits people’s wellbeing without 
choosing any sides.  The journalist 
should not expose his resources and 
release data that was required to be 
confidential. 
 
 
 
Missing 
 Journalists must be aware that any 
information released by them could 
harm the people or governmental 
authorities. This is only allowed if it’s 
public “interest” to do so. 
 
 
 
Missing 
 
The next chapter is analysis that builds on chapters two and three. It directly tackles the 
role of media and its contribution in the Egyptian Uprising of 2011. 
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Chapter Four 
Analysis 
This chapter presents analysis that is based on the previous chapters. It attempts 
to explain the real role of social media in the Egyptian Uprising. This then helps in 
grasping the importance of social media in the Egyptian Uprising specifically and in the 
Arab Spring more generally. For that purpose, a brief comparison between the two 
revolutions (the Iranian and Egyptian) would be first stated again here. 
The comparison between the Iranian Revolution and Egyptian Uprising reveals 
the huge similarities between both. The two revolutions shared the same prerequisites. 
For instance, people felt restless, the government had practiced immense pressure; the 
economy was dwindling and there was no freedom of expression. The revolts in both 
revolutions were enthusiastic. They wanted to topple their regimes. The difference, 
then, is in the tools the revolts used to disperse their messages. As shown previously, in 
the Iranian Revolution the tools used were: the audiocassettes and printed materials 
(such as pamphlets). In the Egyptian Uprising, however, social media was used as a tool 
by the revolts. Social media as a network of communication proved to be stronger than 
the conventional media (according to McLuhan‟s model). This goes back to the fact that 
this media has provided a comprehensive enlistment.  It also: 1) enabled the formulation 
of “social movements”; and 2) prohibited the seclusion of information through grasping 
national and international considerations (ElTantawy and West, 2011). Second, social 
media, in its very nature, incurs no costs. This means that zero dollars are paid to access 
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social media, and it is easy to use. Third, it gathers a huge number of people in seconds 
and it targets all the different sects in the societies. There is no discrimination. Fourth, 
there is no need to have a huge number of users on social media to incur an immense 
effect or change. A user can create a page, for instance, on Facebook that attracts 
millions of users. This is evident in the Egyptian Uprising. One of the pages created was 
“We Are All Khaled El Sayed.” This page alone has further ignited the uprising.  As 
shown in the below Figure (12, p. 72), there were only 131,204 active users of social 
media during the revolution
59
. This shows that there is no need to have a huge number 
of vibrant users on “social media sites” to make a big difference. Conventional media 
on the other hand, though it is cheap and easy to use, does not allow for individuals to 
quickly join forces and discrimination has constantly prevailed in such media. This is 
due to the state‟s ability to easily manipulate the news according to its desires and 
demands. Though they were enthusiastic, the Iranians revolts didn‟t have an increase in 
access to such media (“according to contextualism approach”). Instead, the revolts used 
other forms of traditional media (such as audiocassettes and pamphlets). The opposite, 
however, persists in the Egyptian Uprising. It is true that technology played a huge role 
in the Egyptian Uprising in facilitating access to social media. The Egyptians revolts 
have simply used the technology of their time to abolish anything that would hinder 
their use of social media. This underscores the power of social media as a source of 
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 See Twitter Usage in the MENA Region by Interactive Middle East , it‟s “region‟s online destination 
for internet, mobile, and social media news”: http://interactiveme.com/2011/06/twitter-usage-in-the-
mena-middle-east/ 
 (information taken from Arab Social Media Report: 
http://www.arabsocialmediareport.com/home/index.aspx) 
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message dispersion, and a way of expression and uniting people together. The online 
tools‟ significance can‟t be disregarded.  They were effective in making people go down 
to the streets. This is because of social media‟s purpose in itself. These sites, such as 
Facebook, were used by the people to portray the horrifying reality through the shared 
pictures and videos of the government‟s cruelties. This encouraged more people to rebel 
against their state. These social media sites have also helped in the “logistics” because 
time and place of assembly could be communicated on these sites (Rosen, 2011). This 
power was acknowledged by the revolts and that‟s why they reached out for any 
technology that would help them to reuse social media (especially after internet 
shutdown). Simply put, “social networking” has altered the anticipations of “freedom of 
expression” and the extent to which individuals and groups interconnect, rally, and 
acquire technical knowledge. These are predicted to result in even more voice, political 
impact, and involvement in the coming 10 to 20 years (Ghannam, 2011). The new form 
of media, then, has created the solidarity needed in the Egyptian Revolution, unlike the 
media at the time of the Iranian Revolution. “DW Academy” (a German global 
newscaster), for instance, has offered an empirical study by Eira Martens
60
 on the role 
of social media during Egypt's Revolution. Her research revealed that social media 
aided in classifying protests that permitted participants to form a “collective identity” 
through distribution of photos and videos. This increased the sense of “solidarity” that 
made people take to the streets (Diehn, 2013). Another report on the role of Facebook 
                                                          
60 She is a researcher at DW academy. She attained her master‟s degree in social and economic sciences 
from Friedrich-Alexander University of Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany . See: 
http://training.dw.de/ims/blogs/wordpress/eira-martens-germany/ 
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and twitter in the uprising was issued by Dubai School of Government under the title of 
“Arab Social Media Report”61. It revealed that nearly 9 in 10 Egyptians and Tunisians 
said they were using Facebook and other social networks to arrange and publicize the 
demonstrations. “Social Bakers” (a site that publishes comprehensive information on 
statistics with regard to Facebook utilization in the world) has also revealed that Egypt 
has around 5.2 million Facebook users. This number is lower than 7% of the population 
(Vijayan, 2011). These findings are again showing that social media has played a role in 
mobilizing, empowering, shaping opinions and inducing a change (Huang, 2011). 
Evidence of these findings is revealed in the fact that ever since the January 25 
revolution, internet usage has only grown more and more. An increase in the users of 
Facebook and Twitter can especially be noted. It is common now in Egypt to document 
any protest that may occur in the country through relying on mobile phones to capture 
pictures. These changes are believed to be sustainable and everlasting -- especially 
because people will not have a tendency to stop utilizing the internet. The internet 
would also expand with time (Open Society Foundation, 2013). A report completed by 
“eMarketer” reveals that in the year 2017 the “global social network” audience will be 
2.55 billion. The vast operators of “social user growth” would be from the Middle East 
and Africa (eMarketer, 2013). After all, the majority of developed countries have clearly 
“penetrated social network” and Facebook audiences (Owen, 2014), compared to the 
Middle Eastern countries that have to cope with their governments‟ obstructions 
                                                          
61 This finding in other words came as a back up to the talks on the use of social media in the Arab 
Spring., see artice by Carol Huang : Facebook and Twitter key to Arab Uprisings: report 
http://www.thenational.ae/news/uae-news/facebook-and-twitter-key-to-arab-spring-uprisings-report 
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(eMarketer, 2013).  Social media has been a significant tool that has helped citizens 
achieve the needed political change. After all, the protestors on the streets were people 
and not the social media gadgets (Facebook, Twitter and YouTube) (Abdulla, 2011). As 
stated by Philip Howard
62
, social media wasn‟t a prerequisite for the Arab Spring, but it 
allowed citizens to upset their national politics through, for instance, the formation of 
cybernetic “civil society” (by “online” advocates) to  discuss forbidden communal 
matters (O‟Donnell, 2011). Still, it must be stated that not everything displayed on 
social media is right or precise. An example on this is Bouazizi‟s story (in the Tunisian 
Uprising). It was claimed that he was a university graduate selling fruits on the street. 
The truth, however, is that he never entered university, but millions believed the story. 
This then reveals that many inaccurate things can be assumed by the revolts to be 
correct, but may turn out to be incorrect. Despite such inaccuracies, the false notions 
may still be used in order to succeed in their revolutions (Beaumont, 2011).  This 
further highlights the power of social media in creating a massive impact irrespective of 
whether the matters shared are false or correct. People have simply found the new social 
media (as an element of globalization) to be an easy way of expressing their thoughts.  
They feel that there are no more restrictions on them because nowadays censorship can 
easily be removed with the constant creation of new and highly developed programs.  
Social media is basically a tool that surpasses the government‟s powers to the extent 
that even politicians are using it to express themselves.  Social media is giving the 
power back to the people by allowing them to readjust the country‟s welfare in a way 
                                                          
62 He is an “associate professor in communication at the University of Washington”: 
http://www.washington.edu/news/2011/09/12/new-study-quantifies-use-of-social-media-in-arab-spring/ 
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that works for them. The obstacles of terror and absence of self-confidence have been 
obliterated. This is clearly revealed in the Egyptian case in which these hurdles were 
substituted by "Egyptian pride." This meant that it was not any more tolerable for rulers 
to prevaricate in order to avoid responsibility for their wrongdoings. True confidence 
can now be found in Egypt in the people‟s role and thus this has disposed the Egyptian 
people to only have faith in their own sovereignty (Radwan, 2011). Second, social 
media is helping people to quickly join through unifying common standards. It is simply 
demarcating a “we first thinking and behavior;” i.e. people are thinking and acting 
together on the basis of their interests and values (Mainwaring, 2011). Therefore, in 
Egypt, social media came as their savior from their long standing sufferings since for 
years the country's secret police and state have controlled the media and had – until then 
-- very effectively repressed most rebellious activities. It‟s known, however, that for at 
least a decade Egyptians were practicing collective action before shifting online 
(meaning collective action at the social media sites level). For instance, citizens forced 
unresponsive officials to cancel certain policies through following strategies such as 
obstructing major roads with tree branches and burning tires. All in all, 49 protests were 
recorded in year 2001 by just one newspaper. By 2008, there were hundreds of such 
protests -- either big or small (Ghobashy, 2012).  Undoubtedly, later revolutions would 
utilize social media, but the range of this usage by the revolts is still undetermined. 
Revolts would also seek out new ways of social media deployment (Lindsey, 2013). 
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Figure 12 “Number of active twitter users in the MENA region (Average number 
between Jan. 1 and March 30, 2011)”63 
 
The next chapter is a conclusion or wrap-up of the whole thesis. It briefly 
restates the chapters and adds further recommendations. 
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Chapter Five 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
5.1Conclusion: 
The general conclusion links social media to solidarity facilitation. This means 
that social media provides the solidarity required for any revolution in an easier way. 
This was first detected through considering the role of social media in the Egyptian 
Uprising and second by comparing and contrasting between the functions of the new 
and conventional media (of the Iranian Revolution). The thesis‟s sole focus is on linking 
solidarity enhancement to social media. It didn‟t deal, for instance, with the ongoing 
debate between social media activists and protestors or whether social media helps in 
division (at the societal and political levels) or the number of youth encouraged to 
participate in the uprisings due to the new media or the role of military in revolution 
enhancement or the pros and cons of social media or whether social media was the sole 
factor behind the revolutions. The thesis also doesn‟t underestimate the Iranian 
Revolution‟s importance as the revolution was successful. After all, the Shah was 
removed thereby achieving the revolution‟s main goal. Second, it changed Iran political 
pathway from a modern to an Islamist state. Again this shows that the Iranian 
Revolution of 1978 can‟t be underestimated. The only aspect considered here is the 
media used by the Iranian revolts in the revolution. This helps in revealing the ways in 
which social media helps in solidarity formation (thesis hypothesis) through comparing 
the old media‟s effectiveness with new communication methods.  
77 
 
The thesis then has mainly stressed on several questions for the sake of shedding 
light on social media‟s role. These were: 1) what is the difference amid the new and old 
media?  2) How did the new media enhance the revolution? 3) What role did social 
media play? 4) What did the new media provide? 5) Is social media more powerful than 
conventional media? 6) How could social media be linked to a revolution? 7) What is 
the need of the new media in the Egyptian Uprising? 8) Did social media make a 
difference in the Egyptian Uprising? 
The thesis reached its aim, social media‟s facilitation of solidarity, through 
following the comparative methodology approach to reveal the real role of social media 
in the Egyptian Uprising. First a comparison was carried between the two revolutions. 
This helped in revealing the main difference between both, i.e. the media or the tool 
used to disperse information. Second a contrast was made between the two revolutions 
through taking the different studies: contextualism, Castell‟s Power Theory, along with, 
McLuhan and Lassewll‟s models. This has also revealed the power of social media in 
today‟s world, especially in a revolution. The impact of such media is in the ability to 
make the revolution succeed in a manner that is different than the conventional media. 
Old revolutions, nonetheless, did prosper, but it was a rocky process. This is revealed in 
the removal of the Shah after a year from the start of the revolution. Social media is 
facilitating revolution formulation. Revolutions, in other words, are products of the 
century we are living in. They are quickly initiated and ended (by reaching the goals in 
a shorter time span). In sum, social media played a role in achieving the solidarity 
needed in an uprising through forming a collective identity and way of expression 
different than that of the conventional media. Simply, the new social media is a tool that 
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appeared with globalization. It can be said that social media is the friend of freedom and 
the enemy of dictatorship. So, social media, supported by the internet, has made the big 
difference in Egypt because without the social networking sites like Facebook, Twitter 
and YouTube, young Egyptians could not have built the force that finally removed 
Mubarak from power (Sifry, 2011). It seems that the “digital war” would persist in 
Egypt. This is clearly revealed by old military generals‟ reliance on Facebook to make 
their proclamation and “Muslim Brotherhood” “hackers‟” deployment, i.e. cream of the 
crop of the Egyptian political parties are seeking the top positions in this fight (the 
“digital war”). “Social media technologies” in Egypt are now used by the youth (“left 
and liberal”) and the various “political parties.” These parties rely on this media as a 
way to foster their agendas. Today more are acknowledging social media‟s ability to 
impact a country‟s political inclinations. This means that digital (the ones at social 
media level) and non-digital actions would be utilized together. The former is needed to 
reach to wider addressees. “Social media technologies” have been adhered to and 
accepted by the Egyptian people -- even those having no admittance to internet and 
computers. This is especially because these technologies were considered to be new and 
redemptive. Nowadays, Egyptian advocates and politicians accept the fact that social 
media helps in the formation of “political capital” and in destabilizing the rivalry 
(Srinivasan, 2011). However, despite the incredible role of social media, it remains a 
tool and not more.  As Ghonim
64
 stated, sites, such as Facebook, are simply tools made 
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for joining people together and propagating information to the masses. These sites, 
nonetheless, cannot form social change on their own (Ghonim, 2011). This is shown in 
the imbalance between Egyptian-based grass-root movements on Facebook and the 
percentage of the country‟s overall population. Ghonim also stated that: “we used the 
accessible tools in order to communicate with each other, cooperate and decide on a 
date, a time and a location for starting the revolution. Starting January 28, the revolution 
was on the streets but not on Facebook, it was not on Twitter because those were only 
tools to transmit information, to inform people on the truth about what's really occurring 
on the ground” (Ghonim, 2011).  In other words, here again he is saying that these 
social sites were tools used by the revolts for notifying people of what‟s really 
happening on the ground (Ghonim, 2011).  Therefore, blogging and social networks 
alone can‟t bring immediate political change. This has made analysts stress over the 
long-term impact, the development of novel politics, and the engagement of the civil 
society (Ghannam, 2011). On this point Marc Lynch, a professor at George Washington 
University, stated that the actual influence of political blogging is still likely to lie in the 
long-term impact on the individuals themselves through developing novel political 
capabilities, outlooks and relationships. Accordingly, the institutional political changes 
(the ones occurring over months or years) would not be used as variables to measure the 
impact of the new media technologies over the next decades but, instead, the emergence 
of these new citizens and networks. Indeed, it has long been obvious that social media 
has altered the nature of freedom of expression by giving an exceptional voice to Arabs. 
An example is the outbreak of tweets sent in festivity over Doha, Qatar, being chosen to 
host the 2022 World Cup (Ghannam, 2011).    
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5.2 Recommendations: 
 It must first be noted that there are many works on the role of media in the Arab 
Spring. There are also scholarly works that address the role of media through comparing 
and contrasting the media used in the Egyptian Uprising and Iranian Revolution (as 
mentioned in chapter one). Further studies are still being conducted on the true role of 
social media in the Arab Spring. It is a debatable topic especially because no one has 
ever considered social media to play a role in revolutions. In other words, it was not 
correlated to an insurrection. Instead, it was only considered as a way of socializing 
among people. This is reflected in the restrictions with regard to social media 
examination. These limitations start with the absence of sufficient statistical information 
to determine if there is a direct correlation between low or high internet access rates on 
one hand and potential for revolt on the other (International Relations, n.d.). There are 
then many approaches to the role of social media in the Arab Spring. For instance, Marc 
Lynch, director of the Institute of Middle East Studies at George Washington 
University, believed that social medial is causing “political polarization” because social 
media to him became a place to display where arguments are becoming intense and 
violent. This is indirectly causing a division amid the disagreeing parties (Goldman, 
2013). The topic, role of social media in a revolution, can be taken from different 
perspectives.  There is no right or wrong with regard to this matter. Studies then would 
develop with social media‟s progress. For instance, because social media is becoming 
more graphical, the forthcoming scholarly works may then consider videos and pictures 
posted on such media‟s sites (Arab Media & Society, 2014). Social media, in sum, 
would persist in having a role in the Arab region (at the social, fiscal and political 
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levels), especially because of the expanding penetration rates and number of Facebook 
users (Frangonikolopoulos and Ioannis, 2012). The mere proof of the latter is the latest 
“Arab Social Media Report.” It revealed that in early May, 2014 Facebook users totaled 
81,302,064 while in May, 2013 they were 54,552,875. Egypt still forms a quarter of 
these users (around 24%). As for “Facebook penetration,” in May 2014 it reached 
21.5% after being 15% in May 2013 (Mohammed Bin Rashed School of Government, 
n.d.). 
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